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Abstract—In this paper we discuss the methodology we used 
for a security audit of the European Railway Traffic 
Management System (ERTMS) specifications. ERTMS is a 
major industrial project that aims at replacing the many 
different national train control and command systems in 
Europe. We discuss the stages of the audit, threat model used, 
and the output of each stage of the audit.  
Keywords: security review; security audit; ERTMS; safety-
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I. BACKGROUND 
This paper reports on the methodology we used for a 
security audit of the European Railway Traffic Management 
System (ERTMS) specifications that was commissioned on 
behalf of key UK railway stakeholders and UK government. 
ERTMS is a major industrial project that aims at replacing 
the many different national train control and command 
systems in Europe with a standardised system and consists of 
two major components:  
• ETCS, the European Train Control System, is a train 
control and automatic train protection system (ATP) to 
replace the existing national systems; 
• GSM-R, a radio system for providing voice and data 
communication between the track and the train, using 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) 
technology over frequencies reserved for railway use. 
The ERTMS/ETCS System Requirements Specification 
[1] provides a technical specification of the overall system. 
Network Rail, the authority responsible for the UK’s rail 
network, are preparing to introduce ETCS and GSM-R as 
part of an upgrade of the signalling and communications 
systems running on Britain’s rail infrastructure. 
Within the rail industry, safety has always been 
paramount, but security has not always been considered. 
However, this upgrade has the potential to increase the risk 
of an electronic attack on the rail infrastructure, as it brings 
more systems under centralised control. The purpose of our 
security audit was to identify potential vulnerabilities and 
attack scenarios and suggest mitigations. 
ERTMS is implemented using a number of trackside and 
on-board sub-systems, and the ERTMS/ETCS specifications 
describe the interfaces by which these various sub-systems 
interact.  
In the next section of this paper, we discuss our 
methodology for performing the security audit to identify 
vulnerabilities and our use of attack scenarios to assess the 
impact of these vulnerabilities. However, we do not provide 
specific details of vulnerabilities or attack scenarios, which 
can be found in our detailed reports [2], [3]. 
We stress that the vulnerabilities we identified are 
vulnerabilities in the interoperability specifications rather 
than an actual implementation of ERTMS. There are many 
aspects of ERTMS security that depend on details of the 
national implementation of ERTMS, and it would be 
valuable to explore these issues in more detail in the future. 
II. REVIEW METHODOLOGY  
The ERTMS/ETCS safety analysis [4] considers the 
specifications from a safety perspective to derive the safety 
requirements for technical interoperability. A review from a 
security perspective needs to consider a rather different set of 
potential threats and undesirable consequences. 
A security analysis usually considers threats to 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but here we are 
concerned with train movements rather than the security of 
data, so our primary concern is integrity, then availability, 
and finally confidentiality. Loss of integrity could result in 
accidents or collisions, whereas loss of availability would 
bring the system to a halt. Loss of confidentiality is less of an 
immediate threat, but might result in the leak of sensitive 
operational information. Finally, reliability is also important, 
since an unreliable train service will result in a loss of public 
confidence in the railway operators. 
Thus, the hazards or potential failures or undesirable 
outcomes that ERTMS should avoid are the following: 
• a collision involving multiple trains; 
• an accident such as derailment involving a single train; 
• widespread disruption of train service over a large area; 
• disruption to individual trains, or trains in a local area; 
• creation of a situation that leads to panic and potential 
loss of life (e.g., an emergency stop and uncontrolled 
evacuation onto the track); 
• creation of a situation that leads to passenger discomfort 
and dissatisfaction, (e.g., stopping a train indefinitely in a 
tunnel); 
• loss of public confidence in the railway system due to 
intermittent low-level problems affecting the reliability of 
the service; 
• leak of sensitive information (e.g., movements of VIPs). 
A security analysis also needs to consider the capabilities 
of the attacker. It is usual to make a distinction between an 
insider and an outsider, in other words, someone with 
legitimate access to a system who abuses their position and 
privileges, either willingly or under duress, as opposed to 
someone outside the system with limited access, who seeks 
to break into the system out of curiosity, malice, or for 
personal gain. Historically, railway systems have relied on 
highly specialised, proprietary technology, and there has 
been a relatively small community with the necessary 
knowledge to exploit vulnerabilities. However, the 
widespread adoption of open standards like ERTMS/ETCS 
that are designed to promote interoperability and the 
commoditisation of technology could make both the 
necessary knowledge and the necessary tools more readily 
available to potential attackers. 
The key points we addressed in our security analysis 
were whether ERTMS/ETCS: 
• introduces any new vulnerabilities or threats to the 
railway infrastructure; 
• makes it easier to compromise the system; 
• shifts the balance between the potential for abuse and the 
likelihood of being detected. 
Our approach to the security analysis was to consider the 
context in which ERTMS/ETCS operates, and its trust 
relationships with other systems. ERTMS/ETCS is 
implemented using a number of trackside and on board sub-
systems, and the ERTMS/ETCS specifications describe the 
interfaces by which these various sub-systems interact, and 
how the ERTMS/ETCS application responds to messages via 
these interfaces and ensures that trains move safely. 
In our security analysis we considered: 
• whether there are safeguards built into the system that 
protect against messages being corrupted in transmission 
by the input channel; 
• whether these safeguards protect against all possible 
threats to the input channel (for example, deliberate 
attacks on the channel, as opposed to random failures); 
• whether the source of the input is trustworthy, or whether 
it is possible for the input source to have been 
compromised; 
• whether there is adequate protection at the application 
level to guard against malicious messages generated by 
an attacker who controls the input source. 
With this approach in mind, we performed a systematic 
security audit of the ERTMS/ETCS specifications by 
examining the ERTMS/ETCS application itself, and 
considering its interfaces and trust relationships with other 
components of the ERTMS/ETCS system, both trackside and 
on board the train. We approached the problem using both a 
top down and a bottom up methodology. Working from the 
top down, we considered possible failures of the system (as 
listed above) and how ERTMS/ETCS guards against these 
failures, and working from the bottom up, we reviewed key 
specifications in detail to identify any assumptions, 
weaknesses, inconsistencies, or vulnerabilities in the 
specifications that might provide an opportunity for an 
attacker to compromise the system. Full details can be found 
in our first report [2]. 
Having identified some potential vulnerabilities in the 
ERTMS/ETCS specifications, we were asked to devise 
attack scenarios to explore the ways in which an attacker 
could exploit these potential weaknesses and vulnerabilities 
to achieve one of the undesirable outcomes listed above. Full 
details can be found in our second report [3]. 
We identified seven attack scenarios and then analysed 
each in detail by considering the following questions: 
• how is the attack performed? 
• what vulnerabilities does the attack exploit? 
• where can the attack be launched from? 
• what are the possible mitigations? 
We then graded each attack according to a range of criteria: 
• the type of access required to exploit a vulnerability; 
• the level of technical sophistication required to exploit a 
vulnerability; 
• the type of failure caused by a successful attack;  
• the scale of effect for a successful attack; 
• the scalability of the attack from the attacker’s 
perspective; 
• the type of impact caused by a successful attack; 
• the types of mitigation strategy that are possible; 
• the level of difficulty for implementing each mitigation. 
Our analysis and grading methodology was partially 
based on a technique for scenario analysis that was devised 
by a NATO Research Task Group for a study on the Dual 
Use of High Assurance Technologies [5].  
We considered several different categorisations but chose 
these particular categories because we thought they were the 
most informative and provided a good summary of the issues 
raised by each scenario. We deliberately did not attempt to 
rank the various attack scenarios using a weighted average of 
the category scores because we believe that such a ranking 
would be too simplistic – the relative weighting of the 
various categories and the ranking of the scenarios is a 
matter for government and industry stakeholders. Similarly, 
we did not attempt to estimate the likelihood of attacks being 
successful because this would depend on the national 
implementation of ERTMS and is therefore best left to the 
domain experts. 
Our attack scenarios have been presented to experts in 
the ERTMS/ETCS technologies, who commented very 
favorably on both the approach and the analysis and grading 
methodologies we used.  
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